Thread: The Korea Poll
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Old 04-05-2013, 12:26 PM   #21
DenverBrit
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Quote:
Originally Posted by cutthemdown View Post
talk about a country with nothing any other country would want. But S Korea important to the world economy and obviously Japan is also. The who world would get behind removing that regime if they step too far. When a country has firepower like N Korea it could get really messy really fast if anything big broke out.

I am confident in only a few months we could have most of their military destroyed but in the meantime who knows what S Korean cities would look like. It could only take a few days of shelling to reduce most to rubble.

I read they have over 100 thousand pieces of artillery. Hell that would take a long long time to take out even with drones and sorties flying everywhere.

IMO the best strategy if we ever had to attack them would be the d-day of drone attacks. Launch like 10 thousand all at once for a first wave and overwhelm their defenses.
N Korea's equipment. Big raw numbers, but a lot of obsolete equipment or lacking parts.

Quote:
North Korea’s armoured forces are estimated to include some 3,500 main battle tanks (MBTs), 3,000 armoured personnel carriers and light tanks, and more than 10,000 heavy-calibre artillery pieces, many of which are self-propelled. The MBT force primarily comprises older T-54/55/59 models, but includes some 800 indigenously produced T-62s. Of the estimated 10,000 or so artillery pieces in the North Korean inventory, a considerable number are pre-deployed, in range of Seoul; additional artillery could be moved forward to fortified firing positions at short notice. Of particular concern to Seoul are Pyongyang’s 240mm multiple rocket launchers (capable of simultaneously firing 16–18 rockets), its 152mm and 170mm towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, and its mobile FROG systems – all of which are capable of delivering chemical and biological agents as well as conventional high-explosives. In addition, the ground forces have about 7,500 mortars, several hundred surface-to-surface missiles, 11,000 air defence guns, 10,000 surface-to-air missiles, and numerous anti-tank guided weapons.

The North Korean air force possess some 605 combat aircraft and is organised into 33 regiments: 11 fighter/ ground attack; two bomber; seven helicopter; seven transport; and six training regiments. The air force mostly comprises older MiG aircraft (of the MiG-15/17/19/21 types), but includes small numbers of more modern MiG-23, MiG-29 and Su-25 aircraft. Like North Korea’s ground forces, a relatively large percentage of the air force is deployed near the DMZ – at military air bases only minutes flying time from Seoul. The North Korean navy can be divided into six main groups: 43 missile craft; about 100 torpedo craft; 158 patrol craft (of which 133 are inshore vessels); about 26 diesel submarines of Soviet design; 10 amphibious ships; and 23 mine countermeasures ships. There are also some 65 miniature submarines for the insertion and extraction of Special Forces. Around 60 percent of the North Korean navy is deployed in forward bases, and North Korea has strengthened its coastal defences in forward areas by deploying more modern anti-ship cruise missiles.

On paper, North Korea’s armed forces are formidable, but their actual capabilities are less than the raw data suggest, given the obsolescence of most North Korean equipment. Around one-half of North Korea’s major weapons were designed in the 1960s; the other half are even older. Also, it is certain that due to shortages of spare parts, fuel, and poor maintenance, some weaponry will not be functional. The US Army’s Cold War system for comparing hardware capabilities suggests that ground combat units equipped with modern Western weaponry are about 20–40% more combat effective than units of comparable size with out-of-date equipment. After the 1991 Gulf War, the US-based Analytic Sciences Corporation developed a more up-to-date and realistic model for comparing forces, known as the Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization (TASCFORM), which was utilised in the 1990s by the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment. According to this model, modern Western weaponry is generally two-to-four times more capable than Soviet systems.
Conclusion
Quote:
The combination of North Korea’s long economic decline and enhanced US and South Korean military capabilities has diminshed the threat of a North Korean invasion of South Korea. Nonetheless, North Korea retains the ability to inflict heavy casualties and collateral damage, largely through the use of massed artillery. In effect, Pyongyang has more of a threat to devastate Seoul than to seize and hold it. North Korea’s conventional threat is also sufficient to make an allied pre-emptive invasion to overthrow the North Korean regime a highly unattractive option. In theory, US forces could carry out pre-emptive attacks to destroy known North Korean nuclear facilities and missile emplacements, but such attacks could provoke North Korean retaliation and trigger a general conflict.

North Korea cannot invade the South without inviting a fatal counter-attack from the US and South Korea, while Washington and Seoul cannot overthrow the North Korean regime by force or destroy its strategic military assets without risking devastating losses in the process. In this respect, the balance of forces that emerged from the Korean War, and which helped in maintaining the armistice for 50 years, remains in place. None of the principal parties want to fight a war although they are prepared to fight if necessary. In this respect, the balance of forces creates certain vulnerabilities since it places a high premium on carrying out a pre-emptive strike if one side or the other believes that an attack is imminent. The danger is that war will begin out of miscalculation, misperception and escalation, rather than design. As a consequence, reduction of political tensions and conventional confidence-building measures can help to reduce the risk of war.
More here....http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...e-on-the-kore/

Last edited by DenverBrit; 04-05-2013 at 12:29 PM..
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